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IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
THE TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
REHNQUIST COURT*
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE**
INTRODUCTION1
Welcome, and thank you all for coming to the Annual Nies Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law.
Our guest speaker is Professor Graeme
Dinwoodie, who is the Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Associate Dean,
and Program Director of Intellectual Property at Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
A prominent international authority in intellectual property law, Professor
Dinwoodie has an L.L.B. from the University of Glasgow, with first class
honors, an L.L.M. from Harvard Law School, and a J.S.D. from Columbia
University Law School. Professor Dinwoodie is here today to speak to us
about the trademark jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. We are very
happy and honored to have Professor Dinwoodie here as our distinguished
lecturer in intellectual property law. Please help me welcome Professor
Dinwoodie to Marquette University Law School.
PROFESSOR DINWOODIE’S REMARKS
Thank you, Irene, for that introduction. And thank you, especially to

* This transcript is compiled from audio tape and lecture notes from The Seventh Annual Honorable
Helen Wilson Neis Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law, held by Marquette University
Law School (Apr. 21, 2004) (on file with the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review).
** Graeme B. Dinwoodie is a Professor of Law, Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Associate Dean,
and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Professor
Dinwoodie’s degrees include a First Class Honors LL.B. degree from the University of Glasgow, an
LL.M. from Harvard Law School, where he was a John F. Kennedy Scholar for 1987-88, and a
J.S.D. from Columbia Law School, where he was the Burton Fellow in residence for 1988-89.
1. Marquette University Law School Professor Irene Calboli provided introductory remarks.
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Irene and Eric, for the invitation to deliver this lecture. I had not realized that
Marquette was so close to Chicago. I should have made it to Milwaukee
before now, but I am glad to have done so for this event.
It is a privilege and an honor to comment on a topic of intellectual
property law in a Lecture that recognizes the contribution of Judge Helen
Nies. Although Judge Helen Nies is perhaps best known for her role in the
development of patent law, Helen Nies the lawyer was for twenty years a
prominent practitioner of trademark and unfair competition law. Of course,
she was involved in trademark issues as a judge and commentator also. Many
important trademark issues reached the courts upon which she sat, both the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the predecessor Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. And Judge Nies was an Adviser to the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which was published in 1995,
shortly before her untimely death. Thus, although it might be surprising to
deliver a lecture in Judge Nies’ memory on a topic outside patent law, it is in
fact quite fitting to focus on trademark law in a talk dedicated to Helen Nies.
I have taken as my topic for today’s lecture “The Trademark
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.” In the past, any study of Supreme
Court trademark jurisprudence that purported to identify trends of any
significance would have to have analyzed a much lengthier period of activity.
Although the Rehnquist Court has gradually reduced the number of cases it
hears each year, trademark law is becoming a regular topic on the Court’s
docket. One can, thus, seriously attempt an analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s
trademark jurisprudence in a way that might not have been true of most earlier
Supreme Courts.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has served as Chief Justice since the Fall 1986
term. In those seventeen years, the Supreme Court has issued opinions in—
depending upon how one counts—between six to ten cases involving
trademark or unfair competition law. In some respects, this might not be
surprising. After all, the European Court of Justice has in the last fifteen
months alone issued fifteen opinions on trademark law. Trademark law is
becoming much more significant in our brand- and image-conscious
economy. But the European Court of Justice has no choice; it has to hear the
cases that are referred to it by national courts or appealed to it from the
European Community Trademark Office and the Court of First Instance. The
Supreme Court in contrast has chosen to hear these numerous cases.
Thus, the first question I will address is why has the Court taken this
number of cases? Do the cases taken tell us anything about the way that the
Court wishes to develop trademark and unfair competition law?
Then, I will turn to the opinions issued by the Court and seek to discern a
commitment to a particular vision of trademark law, both in outcome and
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methodology. I conclude that, although the Court has not employed a
consistent methodological approach to resolving trademark problems, the
opinions do suggest that there are certain values that dictate the outcomes in
trademark cases before the Rehnquist Court. But pursuit of those values, and
the nature of the Court’s opinions, will, I suggest, raise difficult new questions
for trademark law.
Finally, I will speculate briefly on what my conclusions mean for the one
trademark case presently scheduled to be argued before the Court later this
year, namely KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression, Inc.2 on appeal
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
I. A SUMMARY OF THE CASES BEFORE THE COURT
I do not wish simply to march chronologically through the cases that the
Court has decided. But it might be helpful if, just briefly, I identify the cases
that I take to embody present Rehnquist Court jurisprudence on trademark and
unfair competition law.
As I said, the Rehnquist Court was formed in 1986, a year after the Court
had handed down its decision in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly,
Inc.3 Since then, the Court has handed down the following decisions that
might be regarded as relevant subjects of my lecture, in reverse chronological
order:
• Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,4 in 2003, held
that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act did not prevent the
unaccredited copying and distribution of an uncopyrighted public
domain work.
• Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.5 (also 2003, though two
months earlier), in which the Court held that a plaintiff seeking
relief under the federal dilution law enacted in 1995 and codified
in Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act must show actual rather than
a mere likelihood of dilution in order to make out a claim.
• Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.6 (2001), a
trade dress case which does not implicate any core trademark
principles, but is really a part of the developing Supreme Court
jurisprudence on punitive damages.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

328 F.3d 1061, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1509 (9th Cir. 2003).
469 U.S. 189, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 327 (1985).
539 U.S. 23, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (2003).
537 U.S. 418, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2003).
532 U.S. 424, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (2001).
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TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,7 a 2001
decision reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and holding,
among other things that I will discuss later, that the functionality
test should deny protection to product designs that are essential to
the use or purpose of an article even if alternative designs might
be available to achieve the same result.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.8 (2000), in which the
Court held that product designs could not be inherently distinctive
trademarks, but rather could be protected only upon proof of
secondary meaning.
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board9 (1999), where sovereign immunity of
a state institution under the Eleventh Amendment was held not to
have been validly abrogated by congressional legislation
regarding false advertising claims.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.10 (1995), in which the
Court upheld the registrability of color per se under the Lanham
Act.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.11 (1992), a case involving
the decor and ambience of a fast-food Mexican-American
restaurant, where the Court held that trade dress (or, certain types
of trade dress) could be inherently distinctive.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,12 in 1989, the first
nominal trademark case heard by the Rehnquist Court, but a case
brought under a Florida state statute that provided an action
against copying of boat hulls. Because the statute looked like it
provided a patent-like right to inventions regarded as unpatentable
under the federal patent law, the Court held that the Florida law
was pre-empted by federal patent law.
If one wished to view cases less formalistically, one might regard
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee13 (1987) also to be a trademark case in which,
although brought under the Amateur Sports Act rather than the

7. 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2001).
8. 529 U.S. 205, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (2000).
9. 527 U.S. 666, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (1999).
10. 514 U.S. 159, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (1995).
11. 505 U.S. 763, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1992).
12. 489 U.S. 141, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847 (1989).
13. 483 U.S. 522, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (1987).
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Lanham Act, the Court by a six to three decision upheld the
legislative award of trademark rights in the term OLYMPICS to
the U.S. Olympic Committee in ways that resembled dilution
protection.
II. SELECTING TRADEMARK CASES
Four of the cases that have been decided—Cooper, College Savings Bank,
Bonito Boats, and San Francisco Arts & Athletics—involved direct challenges
to the constitutionality of the legislation or rule in question, whether under the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cooper), the Eleventh
Amendment (College Savings Bank), the First Amendment (San Francisco
Arts & Athletics), or the Supremacy Clause (Bonito Boats).
The remaining six cases, which are going to be the primary focus of my
discussion, are, however, primarily cases involving interpretation of the
substantive provisions of the Lanham Act. Why did the Court take those
cases? One answer is apparently quite clear: all (perhaps bar Dastar)
involved efforts by the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split. (And the
same is true of the case now pending).
Of course, in comparing the selection of cases in trademark law with cases
chosen in other intellectual property regimes, it is important to note that
different dynamics exist. In patent law, where all appeals come from the
Federal Circuit, circuit splits as such do not arise. Instead, the Court arguably
looks for a split within the Federal Circuit itself, which is arguably harder to
discern. Indeed, the lack of possible circuit splits occasioned by the
centralization of the appellate function in patent cases in the Federal Circuit is
apparently one of the reasons behind Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,14 which might
offer the regional appellate circuits some greater role in patent law.
But in trademark cases it is the circuit split that has been the most obvious
indicator of cases that are likely to be taken by the Court. In Two Pesos v.
Taco Cabana (1992), the Court endorsed the Fifth Circuit rule that trade dress
could be inherently distinctive over the Second Circuit’s insistence that trade
dress could only be protected upon proof of secondary meaning. In Qualitex,
the Court favored the approach of the Federal and Eighth Circuits that color
per se could be registered under the Lanham Act, over the contrary
conclusions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits that although color might be
protected under principles of unfair competition law, it could not be the
subject of federal registration. In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, the Court

14. 535 U.S. 826, 839, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002).
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preferred the actual dilution approach of the Fourth (and other) Circuits over
the likely dilution standard of the Second (and other) Circuits.
In TrafFix and Wal-Mart, the Court took the case to resolve a Circuit split,
but the way that the Court resolved the split was not entirely clear. Thus, in
TrafFix the Court explicitly took the case to resolve the apparent split
between the Tenth Circuit, which in Vornado Air Circulation v. Duracraft had
held that “[w]here a product configuration is a significant inventive
component of an invention covered by a utility patent . . . it cannot receive
trade dress protection,”15 and all other circuits, which had held that trade dress
protection was not foreclosed by the existence of a prior patent on the product
design provided the trade dress was not functional.
Although the TrafFix Court refused in its opinion to endorse the Vornado
rule, neither did it give much solace to the approach of the pro-trade dress
courts with which the Tenth Circuit had disagreed. Indeed, the Court held
that “[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional.”16 And the Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
overcome the inference of functionality. Indeed, it may be argued that the
Court in effect endorsed the philosophy behind Vornado, even if it did not
approve its particular formulation.
Similarly, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros. (2000), although the Court
granted certiorari to answer "what must be shown to establish that a product's
design is inherently distinctive," instead the Court concluded that that
question did not need answering because product design could not be
inherently distinctive.
Thus, in predicting which types of cases the current Court is most likely to
take, we should focus on cases involving constitutional claims, although these
involve provisions less central to substantive rules of trademark law, and
issues of statutory construction where the regional circuit courts have
disagreed. There does not, therefore, appear to be a conscious effort by the
Court to reach into the lower courts to take cases to advance a trademark law
agenda. The agenda is in large part a response to lower court developments.
Yet, although this explains why the Court might take certain cases, it should
not—as Wal-Mart and TrafFix show—be thought to circumscribe the
approaches to substantive trademark law that the Court might articulate.
To work out what is going on substantively, we might need to ask why the
Court is deciding the cases the way that it is.

15. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1333 (10th Cir. 1995).
16. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
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III. THE REASONING AND TRADEMARK VALUES OF THE COURT
Thus, I want to turn now to the reasoning of the six principal cases that
have come before the Court. These cases can conveniently be analyzed in
three groups: (1) first, a set of four trade dress cases; (2) a case involving the
scope of non-trademark causes of action under the unfair competition
provision of Section 43(a); and (3) the first Supreme Court case interpreting
the federal dilution statute enacted in 1995.
A. The Trade Dress Cases
I will start with the four trade dress cases. Recent years have seen an
explosion in the number of “trade dress” infringement cases brought under the
Lanham Act. Although the expansive view of trademark subject matter
reflected in these cases raises more difficult issues for trademark law than
according protection to words or two-dimensional images, it is wholly
consistent with the underlying purposes of trademark protection. Trademark
protection against confusing simulation advances the interests of producers
and consumers by protecting the integrity of consumer understanding and the
producer’s investment in creating goodwill. In turn, trademark protection
reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and encourages the production of
quality products.
If consumers identify a product by its packaging, color, or design features,
these same concerns are no less implicated. This purposive analysis of
trademark protection underlies large parts of the opinions in Qualitex and Two
Pesos. It is in part because trade dress can serve the purpose of a trademark,
and because the nature of the subject matter is, thus, irrelevant to the purpose
of trademark law, that the Court removed limits on trademark protection
derived from the nature or classification of the subject matter.
“[A]nything . . . that is capable of carrying meaning” can be a trademark, said
the Qualitex Court.17
But an essential premise underlying this argument is a mark’s
distinctiveness, i.e., the claimed mark must represent a feature by which
consumers identify and distinguish a product from others. Distinctiveness is
central to trademark protection because, without it, no goodwill attaches to the
claimed mark and, thus, no consumers will be confused by others using the
same mark.
The distinctiveness of trade dress has, thus, been one of the principal
subjects of the recent Supreme Court case law. In 1992, in Two Pesos, the
Court, in the course of upholding trademark protection for the decor and
17. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
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ambiance of a Mexican fast-food restaurant against replication by a
competitor, approved the assimilation of the principles governing the
distinctiveness of verbal trademarks and non-verbal trade dress. In particular,
the Court held that the distinctiveness of non-verbal trade dress may (like
verbal marks) be established by proof of either inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning.
The Two Pesos decision was, however, incomplete in two primary
respects. First, it failed to address the means by which the assimilation of the
principles governing the distinctiveness of verbal marks and non-verbal dress
was to be effected. Classical distinctiveness analysis, developed to adjudicate
the protectability of verbal or pictorial marks, was inadequate when applied to
determine whether a design feature was distinctive.
Thus, lower courts struggled with the development and application of tests
designed to measure the distinctiveness of trade dress. Some continued to
apply the classical (Abercrombie)18 test used with respect to word marks.
Others applied different tests to measure trade dress distinctiveness, such as
the so-called Seabrook19 test, which called upon a court to consider whether a
shape or packaging feature “was a ‘common’ basic shape or design, whether it
was unique or unusual in a particular field, and whether it was a mere
refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation
for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or
ornamentation for the goods . . . .”20 Finally, some concluded that while
existing distinctiveness analysis might helpfully assist in an evaluation of the
distinctiveness of product packaging, it was unhelpful in the case of product
design, and, thus, developed different tests depending upon the category—
design or packaging—into which the trade dress fell.
This final approach required the courts in question to develop new
analytical devices with which to measure the distinctiveness of product
design. The tests that they developed were unduly complex and tended to
provide lesser trade dress protection for product designs than for packaging.
This result was justified in large part by the contention that design features
were less likely to act as trademarks for consumers, a point to which I will
return later.
The development of separate approaches to different categories of trade
dress ties in with the second incomplete aspect of Two Pesos. The extent of

18. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (2d
Cir. 1976).
19. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
20. Id. at 1344, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 291.

DINWOODIE FINAL

2004]

6/10/2005 3:19:25 PM

TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE OF THE REHNQUIST COURT

195

the assimilation announced by the Two Pesos Court was unclear: did it apply
to forms of trade dress other than restaurant decor? In particular, did it apply
to product design? Even some courts that proceeded on the assumption that
Two Pesos did require the possibility of inherently distinctive product designs
held that Two Pesos did not foreclose them from developing separate tests
that might confine the circumstances in which that legal conclusion would be
reached. By either route—blanket denials of inherent distinctiveness, or tests
that effectively precluded the possibility—a categorical approach that
distinguished between packaging and design was being forged.
The Court’s subsequent decision in Qualitex did not clearly determine the
extent of the assimilation effected by Two Pesos. The Qualitex opinion can
be read as expansionist in nature, in that it endorsed the disregard of limits on
trademark subject matter; and the Court rejected the formulation of blanket
rules of trademark law based upon problems that might occasionally be
presented by new subject matter. But the Court also analogized color to
descriptive marks and, thus, appeared to require secondary meaning as a
prerequisite to protection.
These mixed signals suggested, perhaps, an unease with extending the
assimilationist decision in Two Pesos too far. The policy considerations, and
exercises in statutory interpretation, that led the Two Pesos Court to recognize
inherently distinctive trade dress, should arguably permit the same argument
with respect to color. And it should do likewise with product design. But
Qualitex contained hints of caution with respect to color, and some lower
courts found room in Two Pesos to inject similar restrictions into the
protection of product design.
In 2000, however, the U.S. Supreme Court answered some of the open
questions. In a unanimous decision in Wal-Mart, the Court accepted that
while packaging may be inherently distinctive, product design may not. Thus,
although the Court endorsed an expansive view of trademark subject matter, it
also supported a categorical distinction between packaging (which could be
inherently distinctive) and product design (which could not). It thus raised to
the surface the ambivalence that underlies Qualitex.
That the Court was now operating from a different mindset is seen by its
interpretive use of Section 2 of the Lanham Act. Section 2 lists the grounds
upon which a federal trademark registration may be denied; it makes no
reference to trademark subject matter. In Two Pesos, the Court interpreted
that silence as suggesting no basis upon which to make a distinction between
different types of trademark subject matter; eight years later, the Court read
that silence as suggesting no barrier to the development of such a distinction.
Similarly, although the Qualitex Court had analogized color to descriptive
marks, the Court in Wal-Mart made explicit that in Qualitex, “[w]e held that a
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color could be protected as a trademark, but only upon a showing of
secondary meaning.”21
What had altered the Court’s perspective in eight years? The Court
marshaled two primary reasons for requiring secondary meaning for product
design protection. First, the Court suggested that product designs do not
automatically identify source for consumers in the way that packaging or
word marks do. This categorical conclusion probably bears some incidental
correlation to present social reality. But the Court articulated the conclusion
almost as a matter of judicial notice. There may be circumstances in which
design does identify source, and indeed those circumstances may become
more frequent as society becomes more visual and global marketing reduces
reliance on linguistic forms of communication. If the Court believed it less
likely that consumers would identify a product by its design than by its
packaging, it could have adopted a test (like Seabrook) that enables courts to
ask that very question. Instead, the Court foreclosed individualized scrutiny
of its (unsupported) social generalization, by embedding that generalization as
a rule of law.
Given the reluctance of the Court in Qualitex to develop rules of law
based upon blanket assumptions, the thinking that persuaded the Court to
entrench an increasingly questionable factual premise as a rule of law is more
candidly revealed by the second reason tendered by the Court for its
secondary meaning requirement. The Court feared that broad product design
trade dress protection might have anti-competitive effects because design,
unlike packaging or words, serves purposes other than source identification.
Concern for the potentially anti-competitive effects of trade dress
protection is typically reflected in the functionality analysis, whereby a design
found to be “functional” will be unprotected by trademark. Indeed, the
Qualitex opinion elevated the importance of the functionality doctrine by
casting it as the guardian of competition. Despite this, the Wal-Mart Court
viewed the mere possibility of a claim of inherently distinctive product design
trade dress as a threat to competition because a rule of law permitting such a
claim would “facilitate[] plausible threats of suit against new entrants based
upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.”22 The Court’s fear of such suits
stemmed from its lack of confidence that a clear test for the inherent
distinctiveness of product design could be devised.
At oral argument, and in the briefs submitted to the Court, the possible
test upon which most debate centered was the Seabrook test. Samara
endorsed it, and that test was also endorsed by various amici, including the
21. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
22. Id. at 213, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
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United States government. The Seabrook test does, however, suffer from one
conspicuous frailty. Without an overarching test, a mere assessment of
“uniqueness” is irrelevant to trademark law and unhelpful in determining
distinctiveness. The justices noted as much at oral argument. The
government compounded the weakness of Seabrook operating without any
such overarching inquiry by refusing at oral argument to answer questions
regarding how Seabrook would be applied in the case before the Court. The
justices reacted adversely to that response at oral argument, and the Court
(perhaps understandably) responded in its opinion with a conclusion that the
test was insufficiently clear to “provide the basis for summary disposition of
an anticompetitive strike suit.”23
Because such arguments regarding the overarching purpose of the
Seabrook test were not put to the Court, the holding was as much grounded on
concern over the anti-competitive effects of uncertain doctrinal tests, as on a
firm conviction that a secondary meaning requirement was either warranted
by the purposes of trademark law or rooted in the statutory language.
But this prudentially derived conclusion raised another problem—a
common dynamic in the Rehnquist Court’s trademark case law—which the
Court acknowledged. Two Pesos “unquestionably established the legal
principle that trade dress can be inherently distinctive.” The Court
distinguished Two Pesos, however, by describing that case as involving
“product packaging” (which the Court implies can be inherently distinctive)
“or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no
bearing on the present case.”24 And because this categorical distinction
between packaging and design would be difficult to define, the Court
suggested that in close cases, courts err on the side of classifying trade dress
as product design and, thus, require secondary meaning.
The Court believed that this pragmatic approach to the difficulties of
drawing a line between design and packaging would be unproblematic
because it would occur with lesser frequency than would the dilemma that
would otherwise occur, namely seeking to determine the inherent
distinctiveness of product design. Yet this will force, and has forced, a wholly
unnecessary use of judicial resources in seeking to classify the trade dress in
question. And the Court’s dicta suggesting that the stricter rule may not apply
to packaging or some “tertium quid” merely invites litigation on whether a
claimed trade dress constitutes a “tertium quid” akin to packaging rather than
design. In short, the Court’s opinion merely illustrates, rather than solves, the
difficulties of categorical classification.
23. Id. at 214, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
24. Id. at 215, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
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The Wal-Mart opinion has had, and will likely have, a limited effect on
trademark law, because only a small number of product designs would likely
be treated as inherently distinctive under the more liberal approach to trade
dress protection. But it suffers from a flaw that I suggest is repeated in later
cases, especially Dastar, and to which I will return in a moment. It
entrenches (without any factual support) a generalized assumption of
consumer practices as a rule of law. It thus prevents trademark law from fully
reflecting changes in consumer behavior. In particular, it ignores shifts in
social and economic conditions that, prompted by globalization, have made
younger consumers much more visually cognizant.
The fourth and most recent trade dress opinion of the Rehnquist Court,
TrafFix Devices, explicitly addressed functionality. Trademark law excludes
from protection or registration designs that are “functional.” The lower courts
have in the past few years applied a myriad of doctrinal tests to determine
whether a design is functional and hence unprotectable.
In TrafFix, the Court confirmed that “‘in general terms, a product feature
is functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article.’”25 This test, first announced by the
Court in dicta in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,26 had
previously been endorsed by the Court in Qualitex in 1995, but this did not
arrest the development and application of a wide array of doctrinal tests by
lower courts. It remains to be seen whether the TrafFix Devices opinion will
operate as a greater restraint on judicial creativity. The case law since TrafFix
would suggest not.
This is in part because although the TrafFix Court endorsed the Inwood
test, it left open the possible application of other, alternative tests. In
particular, it offered a more ambiguous treatment of an elaboration on the
Inwood test found in its Qualitex opinion. Thus, the TrafFix Court noted that,
“[e]xpanding upon the meaning of [the Inwood test], we have [in Qualitex]
observed that a functional feature is one the ‘exclusive use of [which] would
put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.’”27
But the Court stressed that this “expansion” of the Inwood test articulated
in Qualitex was not a comprehensive definition of functionality. If a design
feature is essential to the use or purpose of the article in question or affects the
cost or quality of the article (the Inwood test), then the design feature is
functional without further analysis of competitive necessity. Thus, for
example, the Supreme Court in TrafFix Devices regarded the dual-spring
25. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
26. 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 n.10 (1982).
27. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
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design of a road stand as functional because that design “provides a unique
and useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind.”28 End of analysis. No
need to consider whether the dual-spring design was one “the ‘exclusive use
of [which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.’”29
Instead, the TrafFix Devices Court appeared to regard the expansion of
Inwood articulated in Qualitex as targeted at what the courts call “aesthetic
functionality.” This historically confusing doctrine excludes from trademark
protection designs which, though aesthetic rather than utilitarian, are essential
for rivals to imitate in order to compete.
Thus, while the TrafFix Devices opinion remains somewhat enigmatic,
under one reading, the Court might be instructing courts to assess claims of
functionality based upon mechanical utility primarily under the above-quoted
Inwood test (which might be called a test of “mechanical necessity”), and only
claims of aesthetic functionality under a test of competitive necessity.
If this were the case, it would require many lower courts to revise current
forms of analysis. For many courts, competitive necessity serves as a guide to
most issues of functionality (whether mechanical or aesthetic); the Court
rejected that standard as a comprehensive measure of functionality. Similarly,
most lower courts have given some weight, in assessing functionality, to the
availability of alternative designs that might serve the same purpose as the
design for which protection is sought. Yet, the TrafFix Devices Court found
that there was no need to have regard to alternative design possibilities if the
Inwood test was met.
Although the Court has rejected the lack of alternatives or competitive
necessity as necessary components of a court’s analysis (or of a defendant’s
case), some lower courts have continued to have regard to both these
questions (often while acknowledging the TrafFix opinion). This is hardly
surprising. Each inquiry is helpful in determining whether a design feature is
“‘essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
of the article’”30 or is one “the ‘exclusive use of [which] would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.’”31 What is
“essential” and what puts competitors at “non-reputation-related
disadvantages” will not be easy to answer absent such subsidiary analyses of
alternative designs and competitive conditions.
Although the TrafFix Court’s discussion of the test for functionality will
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 33, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id. at 32, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
Id.
Id.
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likely be the most far-reaching (and most-cited) part of its opinion, the
question upon which the Court actually granted certiorari was whether
trademark rights could be asserted in the design of an article that had
previously been the subject of a utility patent (since expired).
A split had developed among the lower appellate courts. One circuit
court, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that “[w]here a
product configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention
covered by a utility patent . . . it cannot receive trade dress protection . . . .”32
Several other circuits had refused to foreclose trade dress protection merely
because the design feature for which trade dress was claimed had been the
subject of an expired patent.
The TrafFix Court held that “[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the
features therein claimed are functional.”33 In the case before it, the Court
found that there was a “strong evidentiary inference of functionality based on
the disclosure of the dual-spring design in the claims of the expired patents,”34
such design being “the central advance claimed in the expired utility patents”
and “the essential feature of the [claimed] trade dress . . . .”35 Then, the Court
concluded (without much analysis) that the plaintiff had failed to overcome
the inference of functionality.
The Court’s opinion raises at least two questions concerning the expired
patent-derived inference. First, which aspect of the Court’s description of the
dual-spring design triggered the “strong evidentiary inference of
functionality”?36 In addition to the fact that the design was the “central
advance claimed in the expired utility patents” and the “essential feature of
the [claimed] trade dress,” the Court noted that “the springs are necessary to
the operation of the device” and that the defendant’s product would have
infringed the expired patent based upon the doctrine of equivalents.37 It is not
clear which of these characterizations of the design subjected it to an
inference of functionality.
Second, in what ways can a plaintiff overcome this inference? The
opinion gives little guidance. The Court suggests opaquely that “[i]n a case
where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental
aspects of features of a product found in the patent claims, such as arbitrary
curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted on the springs, a different

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 30, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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result might obtain”38 apparently because such aspects might not “serve a
purpose within the terms of the utility patent.”39
The answer to each of these questions might be more easily detected if the
purpose of the evidentiary inference were more clearly explained by the
Court. Some briefs submitted to the Court sought to rest non-protection for
design features covered by an expired patent on the so-called “right to copy”
the subject matter of expired patents. Indeed, some briefs ascribed a
constitutional pedigree to this right, based upon the conflict between the
Copyright and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. The
Court expressly deferred consideration of the constitutional arguments to
another day. But the Court would also appear not to have based the inference
solely on any non-constitutional right to copy. The inference would appear to
flow in part from the likelihood that design features included within the
claims of a patent are essential to the purpose of the article, and thus that their
continuing protection as trademarks would likely have anticompetitive
consequences.
If this had been explicit—one really has to read between the lines—it
would have made many of these questions, including those I have mentioned
and others such as “where in the patent may one look to find the allegedly
functional trade dress feature”—easier to answer.
B. Victoria’s Secret and Dastar
Two Pesos might be read as the high point of trade dress protection under
this Court, with Qualitex hinting at both expansion and caution. In Wal-Mart
and TrafFix, the Court signaled a desire to rein in claims under the Lanham
Act. The last two cases, both decided last year, are consistent with this last
philosophy.
1. Dastar
In Dastar, the plaintiff was the owner of a copyright in a television series
based upon President Eisenhower’s book Crusade in Europe. After that
television series fell into the public domain for failure to comply with
copyright renewal formalities, the defendant Dastar purchased tapes of the
series, edited them, and added additional material of it own and sold the
revised video tapes as its own product. The packaging for the product made
no reference to the original television series: it said “Produced and Distributed
by” a Dastar subsidiary.

38. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 34, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
39. Id.
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The plaintiffs sued under copyright law (based on other works that were
still in copyright) and under Section 43(a), arguing that Dastar’s conduct in
failing to credit the source of the television series amounted to reverse passing
off. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs on the Lanham
Act claim, primarily based upon the proposition (well-established in the Ninth
Circuit) that the “bodily appropriation” of a plaintiff’s work without
attribution was sufficient to support a Lanham Act claim.
Strictly, Justice Scalia proceeded again from a literal interpretation of the
language of the statute—what does the word “origin” mean in Section 43(a)?
Was the failure to include a reference to Fox or the television series a “false
designation of origin” within the meaning of that provision? Justice Scalia in
fact looked first at the dictionary to answer this question. This would suggest
that the Court is advancing no agenda unique to trademark law; rather, the
Court is following a not atypical approach to statutory interpretation.
But given that the language of Section 43(a) is clearly susceptible to more
than one interpretation, one might suspect that there is something else going
on. The Dastar Court appears willing to reject the endorsement of judicial
development of this cause of action in the legislative history to the 1988
Berne Convention Implementation Act. Yet, the Court was also ready to
accept in Two Pesos the endorsement of judicial expansion of the scope of
trade dress actions in the legislative history to the 1988 Trademark Law
Revision Act. Thus, mere statutory interpretation tools do not provide a
complete explanation
Justice Scalia’s opinion does offer some hints as to other explanations.
The Court appears heavily influenced by a variety of considerations that it
views as supporting its conclusion that “origin” simply means the producer of
the tangible goods offered for sale (Dastar) and not the author of any idea or
expression embodied therein (Fox) and, thus, that Dastar engaged in no false
designation of origin.
Once again, the Court engages in amateur psychology by hazarding
guesses as to what information would be of interest to the purchaser of the
tape—Justice Scalia, clearly the prototypical consumer, concludes that
consumers are interested in who stands behind the product, not the person
who contributes the ideas that are embodied in the product. “The words of the
Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no
consequence to purchasers.”40
Justice Scalia acknowledges that the purchaser of what the Court calls a
“communicative product” such as the video tape might be interested in the

40. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32-33, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
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source of the intellectual content. But his unwillingness to offer legal redress
based on that possibility reveals two other aspects of the Court’s evolving
approach to the Lanham Act.
First, the Court is concerned about the practical difficulties for rival
producers that broad protection would create. Which persons—authors,
directors, actors, publishers, broadcasters—would have to be identified?
Moreover, the Court suggested that if Dastar had placed the names of any of
those people, including Fox, on its tape, it might have been sued under a false
endorsement theory. The Court appears concerned that competitors be able to
engage in properly competitive conduct—assuming the work is out of
copyright—without the uncertainty of not knowing who to credit, and without
the litigation chill of being sued no matter what attribution strategy it
followed.
Second, the Court notes that allowing the plaintiff’s argument to proceed
would conflict with case law establishing the right to copy a work that has
fallen in the public domain. Putting aside the doctrinal quibble that some of
the precedent cited for this right—such as Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co.41—expressly conditioned this right on the defendant’s obligation not to
mislabel the product, what is clear is the Court’s continuing concern with
what it noted in TrafFix: broad protection under the Lanham Act might come
to interfere with other intellectual property regimes. Indeed, in this case, the
Court described the plaintiff’s argument as seeking to create a species of
“mutant copyright.” The Court would appear willing to try and confine
trademark law to questions of misrepresentation rather than misappropriation,
and will not allow the unfair competition provision of Section 43(a) to roam
much further.
The Court, thus, emphasizes, consistent with its recent trade dress law,
that Section 43(a) “does not have boundless application . . . .”42 The Court is
clearly adopting a much more restrictive view of the reach of the Lanham Act.
2. Victoria’s Secret
When a sex shop owner called his store Victor’s Little Secret, the owners
of the Victoria Secret’s mark for lingerie sued for dilution under Section 43(c)
of the Lanham Act. The Court was faced with the question whether
Victoria’s Secret could prevail by showing a likelihood of dilution (the test
under most state laws) or had to show actual dilution.
Relying again primarily on the language of the federal statute, and its
contrast with state statutes, the Court held that actual dilution had to be
41. 305 U.S. 111, 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296 (1938).
42. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
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proved. Again, this might seem like an opinion reflecting mere statutory
interpretation methodology, and insisting that Congress be clear in the
enacting statute. And here the policy arguments do seem to have been less
influential. Rather, the principal connection between Victoria’s Secret and
other Rehnquist Court case law is the extremely narrow doctrinal point it
resolved, and the morass of questions that it opens up.
Thus, although the Court held that actual dilution is required, it did not
say how that should be proved. The Court did state that mere “mental
association” between the two marks is not actual blurring (or tarnishment), “at
least where the marks at issue are not identical . . . .”43
The relevance of this throwaway “identity” language has already caused
confusion in the lower courts, with some courts in fact restricting any action
to identical marks. And even in those courts that have not adopted such a
strained reading of the opinion, the Court’s apparent effort to create (albeit in
side-comment) a bright line concept will result in abstract discussion of the
question of identity (rather than effects on the distinctiveness of a mark), just
as trade dress cases now spend too much time on whether a mark is design or
packaging—and I still await decisions on the meaning of tertium quids.
To be sure, the Court would appear to want certainty of proof rather than
speculation, but it left open the door to lower courts’ divergent interpretation
of the required proof outside the identity context. Thus, the Court correctly
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s remarkably strict but arguably clear demand for
actual loss of sales or profits—but did not say what the alternatives might be.
The Court did, in response to arguments that surveys were going to be
hard to construct, expensive and unreliable, indicate that direct evidence of
actual dilution (such as surveys) would not be required if actual dilution could
be proved through circumstantial evidence. But the only example it gave of
circumstantial evidence was identical marks.
Finally, as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence (which almost reads as a
dissent) makes clear, the standard will be hard to apply in the injunction
context, where analysis of likelihood of success on the merits might import
likelihood standards into the test.
Thus, if the Court does intend to restrict the dilution cause of action to
identical marks, it has not made that very clear. If it did not have that intent,
it has offered no guidance to lower courts on the means by which to assess the
test that it has now imposed.

43. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807-08.
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IV. THEMES AND TRENDS
So, before predicting the outcome in KP Permanent, let me summarize
some of the principal themes and trends that one might detect in these
opinions. Some of these are more speculative than others. First, the 1995
decision of the Supreme Court in Qualitex, although expansive in so far as the
Court accepted the registration of color per se as a trademark, contained the
first suggestions that the Supreme Court might restrain the excesses of Two
Pesos. This restraint has been made more explicit by the two most recent
Supreme Court trade dress decisions, namely Wal-Mart and TrafFix Devices.
Thus, the TrafFix Devices Court, noted that “in Wal-Mart, we were careful to
caution against misuse or over-extension of trade dress.”44 The two cases
decided last year are consistent with that approach. The Court is clearly
moving toward a narrower view of trademark law (although that may be in
part a response to the protective developments coming from the lower courts
and Congress).
Second, the Court’s decisions are often doctrinally quite narrow—I am
thinking here of Moseley or Dastar—but may have a broader short-term effect
in the lower courts than the doctrinal rule articulated might suggest. Since the
Moseley and Dastar cases last year, several lower courts have dismissed or
pushed back other cases that might easily be distinguished on a doctrinal
level. That is, the lower courts have understood the symbolism as well as the
doctrine in the Supreme Court opinions. But in the long-term, the symbolic
value may diminish. For example, I would not be surprised to see lower
courts, in the absence of a proper law of unfair competition in the United
States, undermine Moseley by stretching notions of actionable confusion
where defendants are clearly bad actors.
Third, although in a couple of these cases (notably TrafFix and Dastar)
parties or amici curiae made arguments grounded in the Constitution, the
Court has steered away from resting its decisions on a constitutional basis.
Yet, it is possible that these constitutional arguments may be the elephant in
the corner. That is, the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation may be
influenced by a desire to stay away from constitutional questions.
Fourth, almost all the cases ostensibly rely on literal interpretation of the
language of the Lanham Act (since Qualitex, to support a pro-defendant
conclusion). But, although any advocate has to come to the Rehnquist Court
armed with textualist arguments, the Court’s inconsistent use of textual
interpretation (most notably between Two Pesos and Wal-Mart) shows that
other considerations do inform the Court’s analysis.

44. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
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Fifth, and clearly one of those “other considerations,” the Court appears to
view certainty as a value to be promoted. But I sense that it is certainty for
competitors—rather than consumers, as one might expect of trademark law—
that is key for this Court. Thus, in Wal-Mart, the Court feels that competitors
need the “legal” certainty of being able to dismiss strike suits; in TrafFix, the
Court gives some weight to the competitor’s certainty in being able to practice
expired patents; and in Dastar, where the certainty of being able to copy and
adapt a public domain work is likewise present, the Court is also concerned
that the competitor know with some certainty the person from whom it has to
obtain licenses. And the Dastar Court is also concerned with the certainty
that the defendant would be sued, no matter whether it attributed or failed to
attribute. That kind of certainty—a certainty of uncertainty, as it were—is not
what the Court wishes to encourage.
Sixth, the Court seems to think it can achieve this certainty through the
articulation of bright lines rules (“identical marks” in Moseley, the product
design/packaging distinction in Wal-Mart), strong presumptions (of
functionality, in TrafFix) and strict standards of proof (of secondary meaning,
in Qualitex and Wal-Mart, and actual dilution in Moseley). But these bright
lines may in fact simply lead to more abstract, and more doctrinally complex,
inquiries that undermine the Court’s goal of certainty.
Seventh, although competitiveness is a value that underlies many of the
Court’s opinions, this is a malleable consideration, which the Court uses
strategically to bolster its conclusion. Thus, in Two Pesos and Qualitex,
competitiveness demanded the availability of protection for trade dress; in
Wal-Mart and TrafFix, a concern for competition supports a more limited
view of trademark law. I do not mean to suggest that the Court has
necessarily been inconsistent; over-protection and under-protection might
equally be anticompetitive. Perhaps this merely shows that competition is a
variable that will be relevant in properly calibrating the scope of trademark
protection.
V. KP PERMANENT
So what does this mean for KP Permanent? In this pending case, the
Court is being asked to resolve another circuit split. The Second Circuit will
allow a fair use defense if the defendant makes a good faith descriptive use of
a mark, even if that use might cause a likelihood of confusion. The Ninth
Circuit holds that a fair use defense will only be available where the
defendant’s use will not create a likelihood of confusion.
This issue is quite well-defined for the Court, and might appear quite
narrow. But it might also have knock-on effects on a debate taking place both
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within the lower U.S. courts and in the European Union regarding whether a
defendant’s use must be “use as a trademark” in order to infringe plaintiff’s
rights.
But concentrating on the narrow issue for present purposes, I think that,
on balance, the Court will find that the availability of a fair use defense is not
conditioned on there being no likelihood of confusion. As this conclusion
rests on some observations that I have already made, let me simply indicate
what those are and how strongly they cut in favor of this conclusion.
First, textualism: if there is no likelihood of confusion, then there is no
prima facie case and, thus, no need for an explicit statutory defense.
Second, the conclusion I predict would arguably be consistent with the
general trend of the Court’s opinions reining in the scope of trademark
protection. But it is not so obvious that the lower court rulings (or the
statutory language) on this issue have been expansionist in nature, so it does
not seem as obvious a candidate for a pro-defendant ruling by a Court
determined to put the brakes on “misuse or overextension” of trade dress law,
or the creation of a “mutant species of copyright.”
Moreover, the debate in the lower court in this case also involved the
question of whether the mark in question was generic or descriptive. The
Ninth Circuit found that the mark in question was not generic, and even if it
were descriptive, the offensive use of incontestability (sanctioned in Park ‘N
Fly right before the Rehnquist Court came into being) precluded the assertion
of that argument. A broad fair use defense might be perceived as a way of
cutting back on the supposed property-like effects of incontestability (I say
“supposed,” because a plaintiff holding a registration that has become
incontestable still has to show likelihood of confusion, which if the mark is
descriptive, will be harder to do.) However, to do so the Court would have to
undervalue the certainty gains secured for the trademark owner by
incontestability. Thus, it is not entirely clear where or how this case fits with
the pro-defendant trend of recent decisions in light of possibly conflicting
certainty impulses.
Third, one can see hints in TrafFix (and perhaps in Dastar, though one
would have to read the opinion more broadly than I would to do so) that the
Court might be willing to tolerate some degree of consumer confusion in
order to vindicate other values that it identifies as underlying intellectual
property law generally. In those cases, the Court appears to elevate the
negative purposes of the copyright and patent system over the positive
purposes of the trademark system. Might the Court be willing to tolerate
some confusion—as does the Second, but not the Ninth, Circuit—in order to
effectuate other values? In particular, might the concern for competitors and
competition swing the Court toward permitting defendants to make necessary
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descriptive uses of marks despite likely confusion.
Fourth, and perhaps this is most speculative of all, the Court might wish to
signal to producers that they should adopt marks that are not so close to the
threshold of protectability. This would be consistent with what might be an
implicit aspect of the later trade dress cases, namely, that producers should
use source-identifiers that are arbitrary, or use labels over designs to identify
source. The Qualitex Court appeared unreceptive to a similar argument based
on likely producer need to use source-identifiers other than labels. And one
might also be resistant to the argument if one perceived of trademark law as
reactive (to the understandings of consumers) rather than pro-active (in
shaping the choices of producers and those signs that consumers are most
likely to rely on).
But I think that the Court’s more recent decisions (particularly Wal-Mart
and TrafFix) do suggest the Court’s impatience with producers who select
marks that implicate these hard questions because of the duality of designs as
product features and marks. Descriptive marks raise parallel concerns in that,
like designs, they possess a duality (as source-identifiers if they acquire
secondary meaning, and as descriptors) that makes them valuable to
competitors—and, thus, especially valuable to the initial producer.
Again, this is highly speculative on my part. The most persuasive reason
for reversal of the lower court has nothing to do with trademark law. The
opinion being reviewed was written by the Ninth Circuit, and so there is a fair
chance that it will be reversed by the Rehnquist Court. With that only
slightly-serious consideration, I will conclude and will be happy to take
questions.

